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95 
The Misconceived Modern Attack on Right to 
Work Laws 
Richard A. Epstein† 
After a long period of relative quiescence, labor and employment 
law have once again become hot topics on both the legislative and judi-
cial fronts. One area of deep contention concerns state right to work 
(RTW) laws in the private sector, controversy over which, along with 
two recent judicial opinions on the topic, will be the focus of this paper. 
Two decisions, Judge Diane Wood’s dissent from the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Sweeney v. Pence,1 and the opinion of Wisconsin Cir-
cuit Court Judge C. William Foust in International Ass’n of Machinists 
District 10 v. Wisconsin2 have both insisted that the state implementa-
tion of right to work laws (RTW), which allow nonunion members in a 
bargaining unit not to pay any dues or fees to the union representative, 
count as uncompensated takings of union’s right to collect some dues 
from these nonunion members. Judge Wood also insisted that under the 
National Labor Relations Act the entire governance of labor-manage-
ment relationships is governed by federal law, which preempts the abil-
ity of the states to insulate those workers who opted out from the union 
from paying their “fair share” of the union’s expense in order to over-
come the freerider problem that otherwise would arise.3 Judge Wood’s 
opinion was a dissent, and Judge Foust’s decision was recently over-
turned by an appellate court.4 
Nonetheless, the issues remain sufficiently salient that a more 
thorough examination of this problem seems appropriate, especially 
 
 † The Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, The New York University School of Law; The Peter 
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and the James Parker Hall Distin-
guished Service Professor of Law, emeritus, and senior lecturer, The University of Chicago. I 
should like to thank Connor Haynes, Carmiel Schickler, and Nathan Yaffe, NYU Law School class 
of 2017 for their valuable research assistance. I should also like to thank the participants of the 
NYU Law School faculty workshop for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
 1 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 2 No. 2015CV000628, 2016 WL 8504732 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016) (Machinists). 
 3 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 680. For earlier cases on preemption, see Local 174, Teamsters v. Lu-
cas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
 4 No. 2016AP820, 2017 WL 4158729 (Wis. App. Ct. Sept. 19, 2017). 
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since of these RTW laws are now in effect in twenty-eight states.5 The 
distribution is far from random. There are no RTW states in the north-
east or along the west coast, but every southern state, as well as many 
Midwestern states, furnish RTW laws. In the last five years the ranks 
of RTW states has increased as Indiana (2012), Kentucky (2017), Mich-
igan (2013), Missouri (2017), West Virginia (2016) and Wisconsin (2015) 
have adopted such laws. As the RTW movement has gained ground, so 
too has the resistance to its expansion. Union stalwarts see RTW laws 
as a mortal threat to their continued existence. The AFL-CIO states, 
“The real purpose of right to work laws is to tilt the balance toward big 
corporations and further rig the system at the expense of working fam-
ilies. These laws make it harder for working people to form unions and 
collectively bargain for better wages, benefits and working conditions.”6 
In contrast, the National Right to Work Foundation puts the issue in 
terms of individual autonomy, “A Right to Work law secures the right 
of employees to decide for themselves whether or not to join or finan-
cially support a union.”7 
This article is organized as follows. The Section I outlines the key 
feature of RTW laws. Section II then develops the two sides of the tak-
ings argument, the first of which involves the free-rider arguments 
raised by the unions and the second the conflicts of interest claims 
raised by dissenting workers. Section III then explains why the duty of 
fair representation (DFR) is not sufficient to deal with these conflict 
claims. Section IV then analyzes and rejects the claim that federal law 
preempts any effort by the state to enact a RTW law that prevents the 
union from claiming a “fair share” payment for the services that it ren-
ders dissident workers within the bargaining unit. Section V then re-
turns to the takings issue by looking at how strict scrutiny and rational 
basis tests apply to both the NLRA and to its RTW provision. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF RTW LAWS 
In order to get to the merits of this dispute it is important to un-
derstand the legal environment in which these rules are adopted. As 
traditionally understood, RTW laws do not guarantee that every person 
gets a job. Instead these laws have long been understood as a counter-
 
 5 For the tally, see Right-to-Work States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-to-
work_law#/media/File:Right_to_Work_states.svg [https://perma.cc/VXW3-MLQS]. 
 6 Right to Work, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/issues/right-work [https://perma.cc/7FVC-23YW]. 
 7 Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., http://www.nrtw.org/right 
-to-work-states/ [https://perma.cc/Q2JK-GWY4]. 
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weight to the risk of compulsory unionization otherwise created by stat-
ute under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),8 whose 1935 in-
carnation in the Wagner Act was one of the decisive moments in the 
New Deal.9 That statute authorized a system of collective bargaining, 
in which any union that won a representation election became the ex-
clusive bargaining agent for all the workers inside that bargaining unit, 
whether or not they voted for the union.10 
Three manifestations of compulsory union-employee relationships 
subsequently emerged from this system. Under the original 1935 ar-
rangement, the union could insist on a closed shop, under which all cov-
ered employees had to be union members in order to keep their jobs.11 
A variation on the closed shop is the union shop, which allows for the 
hiring of non-union workers, but only on condition that they agree to 
join the union within a certain period of time after employment, usually 
thirty or sixty days.12 A third variation on the workplace arrange-
ment, which holds for public as well as for private unions, is the so-
called agency shop. Under this arrangement, employees need not join 
the union, and hence are not subject to its dues and other membership 
requirements, but are required to pay the union an “in lieu” fee equal 
to union dues.13 Collectively, these three kinds of relationships are com-
monly called “union security” arrangements for the protection that they 
afford labor unions that have secured the right to represent workers in 
a particular bargaining unit. It is now settled that any payments under 
these bargaining units can only be directed toward core union opera-
tions dealing with the collective bargaining agreement, but do not cover 
political expenditures undertaken by the union, for which workers have 
the right to opt out.14 However, RTW laws have established a fourth 
union-employee relationship whereby it is possible to have an open shop 
arrangement, under which individual workers are neither members of 
 
 8 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). Section 157, as modified under the Taft-Hartley Act, touches 
all the bases when it allows for workers to join collectively or to opt of unions, except insofar as 
there are union security clauses. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 9 For a straightforward account, see ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT 
ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 897–902 (2d ed. 2004), written before 
the current controversies arose. 
 10 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 11 29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(3) (1947), amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 
1947, 29 USC §§ 141–97 (2012). 
 12 See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 9, at 900. 
 13 See id. 
 14 Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988) (quoting Ellis v. Railway 
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)) (The current rule covers “only those fees and dues necessary to 
‘performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer 
on labor-management issues.’”). 
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the union nor required to pay dues. Yet nonetheless these nonmembers 
both benefit from and are bound by all the terms of the union agree-
ment. It is the nature of this arrangement that has become the focus of 
contemporary controversy. 
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act profoundly altered the New Deal-era sit-
uation with the passage of Section 14(b), which created a large excep-
tion to the three originally recognized union security arrangements 
(closed shop, union shop, and agency shop) that were otherwise allowed 
for under section 8(a)(3). Section 14(b) reads: “Nothing in this Act shall 
be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements 
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment in any State or Territory in which such execution is prohibited by 
State or Territorial law.”15 The effect of this provision, as stated in the 
standard hornbook on the subject by Professors Gorman and Finkin, is: 
[T]o retreat from the all-embracing federal principles which 
characterize the Labor Act and to permit the states to enact 
right-to-work laws to invalidate union security provisions that 
are otherwise lawful under section 8(a)(3) provisos. The term 
“union security” embraces a number of different kinds of ar-
rangements designed to bolster the membership and finances of 
[the] union.16 
And, as Gorman and Finkin note, these union security arrangements 
include the closed, union, and agency shops, without differentiation.17 
It is Taft-Hartley’s Section 14(b) that opened the door to modern RTW 
laws. 
II. THE TAKINGS LAW DISPUTE: FREE RIDERS AND CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST 
The logic of this position was erroneously rejected, as noted above, 
in Sweeney v. Pence,18 and Machinists.19 The purpose of this paper is to 
offer a critique of both opinions. Both of these decisions held that the 
application of the RTW provisions violated the Takings Clause of Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides, “nor 
 
 15 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). 
 16 GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 9, at 900 (emphasis added). 
 17 Id. 
 18 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 19 Machinists, No. 2015CV000628, 2016 WL 8504732 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016). 
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shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”20 One basic claim made by the plaintiff unions was that RTW laws 
deprived them of the “in lieu” dues they were entitled to from nonmem-
bers, while the unions were still required to provide services to these 
nonmembers. Thus, a taking allegedly had occurred. However, litiga-
tion under the Takings Clause is complicated because of the difficulty 
in choosing the level of scrutiny that courts bring to takings challenges. 
The basic distinction is that a per se takings rule, with strict scrutiny, 
is applied to the physical occupation by the government of property 
owned by any private property.21 But the far-lower threshold rational 
basis test is applied to laws that only impose restrictions on the use or 
disposition of private property.22 These two tests, both of which were 
originally developed in connection with real estate, have been carried 
over to other areas of the law, including labor relations, with at best 
mixed results. 
In my view, the decisions of both the Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin 
Circuit Court are wrongheaded because the consistent application of ei-
ther standard of judicial review can both uphold the constitutionality of 
the basic NLRA and strike down the RTW. Either both stand together 
under a rational basis test, or both fall under a per se taking rule. A 
high standard of judicial review knocks out (correctly in my view) the 
NLRA in its entirety including the subsidiary RTW provisions. Con-
versely, any lower standard of review that upholds the NLRA neces-
sarily validates any permutation on the basic scheme, including the 
RTW accommodations to the NLRA that have been allowable since the 
enactment of Section 14(b). 
As mentioned briefly before, the basic union claim is that RTW 
laws should be rejected because they create an intolerable free-rider sit-
uation under which workers who opt out of the union get all the benefits 
of union membership without having to pay for those benefits. In per-
haps the most well-known articulation of this proposition, at least out-
side the context of union speech, Justice Scalia observed: 
What is distinctive, however, about the “free riders” who are 
nonunion members of the union’s own bargaining unit is that in 
some respects they are free riders whom the law requires the un-
ion to carry—indeed, requires the union to go out of its way to 
benefit, even at the expense of its other interests. In the context 
of bargaining, a union must seek to further the interests of its 
 
 20 U.S. Const. V. 
 21 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 22 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
05 EPSTEIN PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/17  9:02 PM 
100  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
nonmembers; it cannot, for example, negotiate particularly high 
wage increases for its members in exchange for accepting no in-
creases for others. Thus, the free ridership (if it were left to be 
that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed by cir-
cumstances but mandated by government decree.23 
Judge Foust in Machinists cites Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Associa-
tion24 as consistent with its own conclusion that by virtue of RTW, “[a] 
free-rider problem is born—the ability of non-members to refuse to pay 
for services unions are compelled to provide by law.”25 Judge Wood in 
Sweeney takes the same position: “If there is no way to compel the non-
member employee to pay the actual cost of the services the union is ob-
ligated to provide for him, a classic ‘free-rider’ problem arises.”26 The 
argument is then strengthened by the claim that unions are bound by 
a duty of fair representation (DFR) to advocate for, and bear the costs 
of, their nonmembers, as well as themselves, in the collective bargain-
ing negotiations and also to represent the nonmembers in grievance 
procedures. Given their role as the exclusive representative, unions are 
bound to “serve the interests of all members [of the bargaining unit] 
without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion 
with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.”27 
In effect, this DFR protects the nonmembers against harmful union con-
duct and obligates, on Judge Wood’s reading, the union to provide cer-
tain services.28 This is the false foundation on which the violation of the 
Takings Clause is subsequently presumed. 
The attacks on the RTW laws offered in Sweeney and Machinists 
are profoundly wrong in three relevant dimensions. The first is that 
neither decision correctly understands the economics of freeriding 
within the union context. The second is that, as Gorman and Finkin 
noted, Section 14(b) of the NLRA insulates dissident workers from all 
forms of union security agreements, including agency shops.29 The third 
is that the effort of both courts to apply a takings analysis to this case 
is badly misguided, regardless of whether the case is characterized as a 
 
 23 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991). 
 24 500 U.S. 507 (1991). 
 25 Machinists, No. 2015CV000628, 2016 WL 8504732, at *6 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016) (citing 
with approval Scalia’s free-rider argument in Lehnert). 
 26 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 673 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 27 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (cited in Machinists, 2016 WL 8504732, at *4; 
Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 672). 
 28 For critique of the argument, generally see the discussion of Vaca infra, Section I; see also 
Richard A. Epstein, Individual Control over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE 
L.J. 559 (1968). 
 29 GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 9, at 900–01. 
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taking of services, cash, or other forms of property. The brief explana-
tion for this conclusion is that a takings analysis of RTW laws simply 
cannot presume the constitutionality of the NLRA, which in its current 
form could not survive a takings analysis under any heightened level of 
judicial scrutiny. The purpose of this critique is to explain why RTW 
laws are socially desirable, and why they should escape constitutional 
condemnation. 
III. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION DOES NOT ELIMINATE 
SERIOUS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITHIN THE UNION CONTEXT 
The critique of RTW starts with the proposition that the DFR offers 
sufficient protection to dissident workers, whether or not union mem-
bers. Such a presumption is the only manner in which to establish the 
relationship between unions and employees necessary to sustain the 
logic of the takings claim. A closer examination of the case law shows 
that this argument fails in all relevant circumstances, including the 
case of Vaca v. Sipes,30 which I critiqued many years ago in my student 
note in the Yale Law Journal.31 The key objections to this reliance on 
the DFR are two-fold. First, the argument wrongly presumes that a un-
ion under the DFR is bound to represent union members during the 
grievance process. In fact, the statutory scheme only requires impar-
tiality in the basic negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, 
while leaving it to the workers themselves to handle their own griev-
ances at their own expense. Second, at the negotiation stage, the DFR 
is unable to overcome the acute conflicts of interest among the many 
workers to whom it owes that duty. 
A. Control of Individual Grievance under Vaca v. Sipes 
In Vaca, the union refused to process the union member’s grievance 
beyond the first four stages of the internal arbitration procedure.32 The 
plaintiff then sought to maintain a legal action on his own account, but 
the Court held that the union had acted fairly and impartially when it 
decided in good faith that it would not go forward with that grievance.33 
The evident conflict of interest in such a case arises because the 
individual worker has all his eggs in a single basket, while the union 
has to deal with a broad class of cases and cannot devote all its re-
 
 30 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
 31 Epstein, supra note 28. 
 32 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 174–76. 
 33 Id. at 195. 
05 EPSTEIN PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/17  9:02 PM 
102  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
sources to individual claims, especially ones it regards as suspect. Jus-
tice White acknowledged the conflict of interest when he wrote: “The 
collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and adminis-
tered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests of an individ-
ual employee to the collective interests of all employees in a bargaining 
unit.”34 It is surely correct to say, therefore, that the union need not 
back this particular claim, or any other individual claim, in light of the 
evident conflict. It is, however, a very different proposition to insist that 
its good faith decision can block the individual’s pursuit of his own 
claim, where he has a far greater interest. Indeed, the point was well 
recognized under the NLRA in Section 9(a),35 nowhere mentioned in 
Vaca. That key section sets out an explicit arrangement whereby the 
individual worker is entitled to press his own grievance consistent with 
the collective bargaining agreement. As an offset, the union is allowed 
to attend the grievance session to protect its own interest by seeing that 
the settlement does not go outside the boundaries of the underlying col-
lective bargaining agreement, given the possible implications for other 
cases.36 It is for this reason why the union is allowed “to be present” at 
the proceeding, so it can present its views of the contract provisions.37 
But this last caveat does not wrest the control of the grievance from the 
worker, because to read it in this fashion nullifies the initial allocation 
of control in its entirety. The statutory process set out in Section 9(a) 
offers a far superior accommodation of the relevant interests than a 
simple rule that lets the union take over, subject to an implicit obliga-
tion nowhere stated in Section 9(a). The fact that unions typically ne-
gotiate for such control is not consistent with the underlying structural 
safeguard. This statutory right is insulated from reversal by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 
One consequence of following the statutory rule is that it undercuts 
the claim made by Judge Wood in Sweeney that the union is somehow 
entitled to receive compensation because the DFR sometimes requires 
 
 34 Id. at 182 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 312 U.S. 332 (1944)). 
 35 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
 36 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (“Exclusive representatives; employees’ adjustment of grievances directly 
with employer—Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining 
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect 
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That 
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present griev-
ances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the 
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collec-
tive-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining repre-
sentative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.”). 
 37 Id. 
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the union to bear the costs of presenting the grievance to the employer 
for which it receives no compensation at all. But if the correct arrange-
ment of Section 9(a) were followed, the worker would have to bear that 
cost by himself unless he made some arrangement to purchase insur-
ance, whether from the union or a third party, to cover those expenses. 
Simply stated, union compensation is not a right in every circumstance, 
and as such cannot possibly provide the basis for the validation of the 
takings claim. Indeed, the statutory rule here is no different from one 
that requires each party to bear his own cost in litigation. It is also the 
case that the worker can, of course, enter individually into any agree-
ment that cedes the union total control over the case. But what cannot 
be done is for the union to force this result as part of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Section 9(a), passed as part of Taft-Hartley, was 
intended to provide worker protection against the union, not to render 
the employee subservient to it. Hence once the correct rule is used in 
Vaca, any case for requiring the state to compensate the union for its 
loss of dues under the Takings Clause falls apart, given that the union 
has no statutory duty to process and pay for the grievance. 
B. DFR in Negotiation 
Even if the DFR has no proper place at the grievance stage, it does, 
however, have a role to play at the contract negotiation stage where no 
single worker has a disproportionate stake in the outcome. But it is 
nonetheless fair to ask whether the DFR offers adequate protection for 
dissenting workers at the negotiation stage. Unfortunately, the DFR is 
not up to the task. It is at best a blunt instrument that cannot, even 
with the most conscientious union, paper over internal disputes within 
a firm. Nor when unions act in bad faith is it strong enough to protect 
the local minority from the majority faction. 
In 1944, the DFR was created judicially in Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co.,38 which arose under the Railway Labor Act of 
192639 to deal with a manifest case of union bad faith. Prior to the 1926 
Act, black and white railway workers were in separate unions. The law 
required the appointment of a single union to represent all workers, 
which meant in practice that white workers dominated the union and 
systematically relegated the minority workers to inferior positions—an 
arrangement present on all major railroads.40 The evident injustice 
prompted the Supreme Court to invent the DFR to redress the balance. 
 
 38 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
 39 45 U.S.C. §§151–65 (2012). 
 40 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 195–96 (1944). 
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But in truth, the situation for the minority workers grew far worse, be-
cause they always had to battle a hostile leadership. Indeed, thirteen 
years later, the famous civil procedure case Conley v. Gibson41 showed 
how little progress minority workers had made in disputes of this sort 
since Steele. A separate union with its own leadership would have of-
fered these workers far greater protection. 
The situation does not resolve itself when matters of racial preju-
dice are put to one side. Even under ideal conditions, conscientious un-
ions have to make all sorts of decisions that impact all members, and 
which can disproportionately affect differently situated individuals. Do 
they make aggressive demands in collective bargaining negotiations, or 
do they settle for less in order to achieve greater certainty? Or what 
should be done when two firms merge so that it becomes necessary to 
integrate the seniority lists for the two plants: is the advantage given 
to the incumbent workers at the surviving plant, or are the two lists 
dovetailed? In Humphrey v. Moore,42 the Court rightly held that any 
integration of the two lists would necessarily prejudice some workers 
no matter which way it was decided.43 A union cannot be subject to a 
damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t legal regime in every case 
where it has to make hard choices, and hence the Court insulated the 
union from the charge that it breached its duty. 
The DFR is similar to the norm that governs in corporate contexts 
under the business judgment rule. That rule typically requires directors 
and officers of the corporation to act reasonably and in good faith for 
their shareholders.44 The raison d’être of the rule is that no one will take 
on these duties if they can be held liable when their responsible choices 
go wrong, but must then stand aside when the shareholders reap the 
benefits of all successful decisions. The insulation from liability for de-
cisions made through fair processes and with honest judgment is a pil-
lar of the corporate law, and it is only displaced by the “fair value” rule 
in those instances where a conflict of interest puts these officials on 
both sides of a given transaction. At that point, they are required to 
show that their deal is entirely fair to the shareholders as a class. 
A variation on this rule is at stake in cases like Vaca, but with two 
key differences.45 In the business context, shareholders in any public 
 
 41 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 42 375 U.S. 335 (1964). 
 43 Id. at 348–50 (1964). 
 44 For an early case, see Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F. Supp. 905, 911 (E.D. Pa. 
1945) (“[M]istakes or errors in the exercise of honest business judgment do not subject the officers 
and directors to liability for negligence in the discharge of their appointed duties.”). 
 45 See Richard A. Epstein, Redistribution Within Collective Organizations: What Corporations, 
Condominiums and Unions Tell Us about the Proper Use of Government Power, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
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corporation can diversify their holdings in a way in which individual 
employees cannot.46 In addition, shareholders of public corporations 
who dislike the corporate position can sell their shares in a ready mar-
ket.47 But individual workers, often with accumulated seniority and en-
trenched interests, must incur huge losses if they decide to resign from 
the firm, given that they cannot sell their union position to anyone else. 
The point here is not to say that Humphrey was wrongly decided under 
the law. It was not. It is only to insist that, even when correctly applied, 
the DFR offers far weaker protection to minority workers than the con-
ventional accounting presupposes. Even if these workers are allowed to 
not pay dues, there is no way that they can repudiate the union repre-
sentation in order to strike their own deal, or to reject individually deals 
that they do not prefer. Still others who support the union are leery 
about taking a passive stance on negotiations lest the terms negotiated 
for the group be less suitable for them than those that they might have 
able to obtain when they participate inside the union. Thus, even 
though some workers surely think of themselves as free-riders, many, 
even if only a minority, of these dissident workers will not regard them-
selves as free-riders, given that they would prefer to remain outside the 
union even if they had to contribute zero dollars to its support. 
Judge Wood in Sweeney shows her awareness of many of these dif-
ficulties when she writes that there is nothing “inevitable” about the 
current structure of American labor law, which could be reconfigured to 
give minority workers additional rights.48 But she adds: “to repeat, that 
is not the system that the United States has adopted.”49 She also makes 
a political analogy when she notes: “This is hardly an unfamiliar ar-
rangement in a democracy. Even after the most hotly contested presi-
dential election, the person who is declared the winner becomes the 
President for all citizens, not just those who voted for him or her.”50 
This analogy to political governance breaks down at the most fun-
damental level. The reason we have elections for presidents is that gov-
ernment must possess a monopoly of force within the nation in order to 
provide peace and order and other collective goods. There is no individ-
ual exit option, as there is in voluntary markets, where the repeal of the 
NLRA results in clear movement to competition, which provides stabi-
lized state protection of private property and contractual relations. It 
 
LIBERTY 280, 308–10 (2014), for relevant discussion. 
 46 Epstein, supra note 45, at 284–85, 287, 297. 
 47 See generally, Epstein, supra note 45, § I. 
 48 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 671–72. 
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is, however, a mistake to trivialize the collective action problem by as-
suming the sole function of government is to overcome free-rider and 
hold-out problems that pose obstacles to collective life, which could be 
overcome by a tax on all that leaves each person better off than before.51 
That collective action model only works where goods are homoge-
nous and equally valued by all alike—an assumption that does not even 
hold with respect to the provision of street lights: any given light may 
disturb the sleep of nearby residents even as it provides needed illumi-
nation to passers-by. It certainly does not hold for the great questions 
of war and peace, where, after the deliberation, the dissenters are 
bound, even if they are by no stretch of the imagination free-riders on 
the expenditure of others. But given that exit is possible in labor mar-
kets, why tolerate this easily avoidable mass dissatisfaction? Union 
supporters will say it is because they need economic strength to secure 
their interests. But that claim is no better than the claim of industry 
moguls who need protection of legally enforceable cartels in order to 
secure maximum benefit from their operations. The early labor law re-
fused to recognize any such special privilege. Loewe v. Lawlor52 sub-
jected unions to the full force of the antitrust law, only to see that deci-
sion overruled by Section 6 of the Clayton Act,53 which exempted unions 
from its provisions, and thus set in motion a set of special privileges 
ultimately embodied in the NLRA. Thus, any justification for binding 
dissenters in governmental contexts does not carry over to dissenting 
employees in labor markets. 
The RTW laws do not create complete exit rights for dissenting 
workers because they cannot escape union representation even if they 
need not pay dues. But the competitive pressure created under RTW 
laws has a generally positive effect on union operations. Two amicus 
curiae briefs written in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n,54 which 
dealt with First Amendment issues outside the scope of this essay, il-
lustrate the point.55 Once unions are faced with the possibility of defec-
 
 51 For this model, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
 52 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
 53 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012) (“The labor of a human being is not a 
commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to 
forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted 
for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid 
or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate 
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be 
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”). 
 54 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 55 Brief for the Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Friedrichs v. CA Teachers Assoc., 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915), 2015 WL 
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tion, they will take steps to counter those losses by becoming more re-
sponsive to the interests of actual and potential members. The salaries 
for union officials go down, as do dues, on the order of ten percent, which 
means a better deal for union members, leading to a reduction in mem-
bership losses. Union members are still worse off than before the adop-
tion of RTW laws, but the conflict of interest between unions and work-
ers, which is hidden by the current rhetoric, is more readily resolved by 
market effects. No union membership is perfectly homogenous. The 
DFR thus cannot simultaneously protect two classes of workers: those 
who would rather negotiate without the union, and those who lose from 
a collective bargaining interest that prefers some other faction to their 
own. 
IV. MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 14(B) 
In Sweeney, the union made the claim that the RTW law in the case 
fell outside the scope of Section 14(b) because it called for a total elimi-
nation of all dues, and therefore did not allow the union to recover from 
these workers their “fair share” of the costs of collective bargaining, a 
point Judge Wood accepts in her dissent.56 Initially, the point seems odd 
because there is no reference in either the statute or the legislative his-
tory to a fair share regime, nor any indication of just how that fair share 
might be calculated. Indeed, the key cases on which Judge Wood relies 
to deal with this matter point quite clearly in the opposite direction. 
The initial statement of the problem is found in Retail Clerks v. 
Schermerhorn,57 as follows: 
At the very least, the agreements requiring “membership” in a 
labor union which are expressly permitted by the proviso are the 
same “membership” agreements expressly placed within the 
reach of state law by § 14(b). It follows that the General Motors 
case58 rules this one, for we there held that the “agency shop” 
arrangement involved here—which imposes on employees the 
only membership obligation enforceable under § 8(a)(3) by dis-
charge, namely, the obligation to pay initiation fees and regular 
dues—is the “practical equivalent” of an “agreement requiring 
 
5317008; Brief for the Mackinac Center for Public Policy as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Friedrichs v. CA Teachers Assoc., 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915), 2015 WL 5461532. 
 56 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 57 373 U.S. 746 (1963) (Retail Clerks I). 
 58 NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 743 (1963). 
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membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment.” Whatever may be the status of less stringent union-secu-
rity arrangements, the agency shop is within § 14(b).59 
The position was reiterated in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn,60 
where Justice Douglas was, if anything, even more emphatic, when not-
ing that “even if the union-security agreement clears all federal hurdles, 
the States by reason of § 14(b) have the final say and may outlaw it.”61 
In the face of this stern language, Judge Wood claims the only impact 
of these decisions was to allow states to outlaw a requirement of full 
payment of union dues, but to leave open the payment of lesser amounts 
under the fair-share obligation.62 But that point is surely wrong. In Re-
tail Clerks I, the RTW clause in question exempted from dues contribu-
tions issued toward political activities that were covered in the earlier 
General Motors case.63 The case law takes the view that all types of 
agency clauses are governed by the same rule. Thus, in International 
Union v. NLRB,64 the D.C. Circuit wrote as follows: 
The Union’s “representation fee” is a “less stringent union-secu-
rity arrangement” than the fee in [Retail Clerks I] because it is 
not set to equal union dues. The representation fee thus escapes 
[Retail Clerks I’s] holding, but not its rationale as restated in 
recent dicta: “Section 14(b) simply mirrors that part of § 8(a)(3) 
which focuses on post-hiring conditions of employment.”65 
Judge Wood tries to deflect this uniform line of case law by accus-
ing the majority of double think for “its decision to assign the status of 
statutory ‘members’ to nonmembers of the union,”66 which sounds like 
a contradiction until it is understood against the paramount need to 
ensure that judicial interpretation does not negate the statute by allow-
ing a union to insist on its practical equivalent, namely by collecting 
dues from nonmembers. The effort to use this form of anti-circumven-
tion norm is par for the course in all areas of interpretation, in order to 
make sure that close substitutes do not have disjointed treatment from 
 
 59 Retail Clerks I, 373 U.S. at 751–52. 
 60 375 U.S. 96 (1963) (Retail Clerks II). 
 61 Id. at 102–03. 
 62 Sweeney, 766 F.3d at 676. 
 63 Retail Clerks I, 373 U.S. at 751–52. 
 64 675 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 65 Int’l Union v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257, 1261–62 (citing Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l 
Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 417 (1976)). 
 66 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 675 (citing NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963)). 
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those activities that fall within the statute.67 The standard definition of 
a union security agreement is intended to preserve that functional 
equivalence. 
To be sure, it does not follow that the reach of Section 14(b) is un-
limited. In NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors 
of America, Inc.,68 the Fifth Circuit held that nothing in Section 14(b) 
prohibited a clause that required a nondiscriminatory hiring hall in the 
construction industry.69 “[T]he long and the short of this matter is that 
§ 14(b) contemplates only those forms of union security which are the 
practical equivalent of compulsory unionism.”70 There is not the slight-
est suggestion that this case even questioned the broad reach of Section 
14(b). Nor is there any reason to think that some dues reduction de-
stroys the “practical equivalen[ce]” and the various fees. The initial 
statement of Gorman and Finkin has to be correct because Section 14(b) 
allows the state to knock out all forms of agency shop arrangement in 
their entirety.71 But that section does not allow the individual workers 
to repudiate union representation so long as they remain in the bar-
gaining unit. 
V. A MULTI-LAYERED TAKINGS ANALYSIS: STRICT SCRUTINY VERSUS 
RATIONAL BASIS 
Once it is held that Section 14(b) does not preempt the ability of 
the state to outlaw all forms of the agency shop, the question arises 
whether that Section can be challenged under the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. As the matter was teed up, the only question before 
the court in Sweeney and Machinists was whether the states can use 
their RTW laws to extricate nonmembers from dues without paying the 
union a sum equal to the dues lost from their membership. The implicit 
theory is that the union has either a property right or some investment-
backed expectation in the continued receipt of the dues that were 
“taken” by the state once the RTW statute is put into play. In both 
 
 67 For a relatively long discussion of the point, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT Ch. 3 (2014). 
 68 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 69 A hiring hall is organized by unions to place their members in different jobs. These are 
needed in industries like construction and stevedoring where work is often done under a daily and 
short-term basis, so that no given worker is paired with a single employer throughout the term of 
the master agreement that usually covers multiple employers. See, e.g., NLRB Hiring Halls, NAT’L 
LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employees/i-am-represented-
union/hiring-halls [https://perma.cc/Z3A2-64V8]. 
 70 NLRB. v. Houston Chap. Ass’n Gen’l Con., 349 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966) (citing NLRB. v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); Retail 
Clerks I, 373 U.S. 746 (1963)). 
 71 See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 9, and accompanying text. 
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Judge Wood’s Sweeney dissent, and Judge Foust’s Machinists opinion 
that follows it on most particulars, the key cases are federal constitu-
tional cases in support of the proposition that just compensation is 
needed before the union loses any advantage conferred upon it by the 
NLRA.72 On this view, it would seem that even Congress could not 
amend the NLRA to impose, at the federal level, a RTW law similar to 
that adopted in Indiana and Wisconsin. 
Analytically, there is no reason why the rational basis analysis that 
sustained the basic NLRA statutory scheme would require a different 
result if Congress decided to move the balance a bit closer to manage-
ment’s side of the ledger rather than labor’s side. Once the federalism 
overtones are removed from the debate, adding the RTW principle into 
the NLRA is just one of a number of permissible statutory options open 
to Congress. It is therefore a mistake to argue that the adoption of RTW 
necessarily creates a one-way ratchet, so that once that option is put 
into place, it cannot be taken out. It cannot be the case that even though 
Congress has no constitutional duty to pass a collective bargaining stat-
ute, it must give a union just compensation from the federal govern-
ment for the cost of running its operations for the benefit of dissident 
workers, when it has already conferred upon them enormous monopoly 
power. 
Indeed, to take this position raises issues never broached on the 
passage of Taft-Hartley, for, if adopted, a constitutional gloss on RTW 
laws strengthens the union position relative to a statute that contains 
no such RTW option. Under Judge Wood’s proposed regime, the union 
should now be quite happy to encourage defections by disgruntled work-
ers because it recoups all the lost revenue from the state or federal gov-
ernment, as the case may be. Hence it gets to rule with an iron hand 
because the dissidents now have no say in the governance structure of 
the union. It is inconceivable that either the federal government or the 
states would write this kind of blank check, so that the proposal in prac-
tice spells the end of RTW laws in all forms. 
In light of these considerations, one should pause long and hard 
before reaching the conclusion that the elaborate political compromise 
which led to the passage of the NLRA is now constitutionally mandated 
by the Takings Clause. Nonetheless, ironically, just that view has been 
attributed to me by Heather Whitney, who in writing about just com-
pensation issues set up the problem as follows: 
 
 72 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 671–85 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting); Machinists, 
No. 2015CV000628, 2016 WL 8504732 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016). 
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If you take the position that “all regulations, all taxes, and all 
modifications of liability rules [should be understood as] takings 
of private property prima facie compensable by the state,” the 
answer is easy: yes. Conversely, if you are an originalist and be-
lieve that the Takings Clause was narrowly meant to require 
compensation when the government exercises its power of emi-
nent domain—that is, when the government physically seized 
property—the answer is also easy: no.73 
The quoted material in the first part of the passage is from my book 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain,74 and the 
second is from William Treanor’s influential article on the original un-
derstanding of the Takings Clause, which takes the view that the Tak-
ings Clause only applies to physical takings and not to regulations that 
simply limit use and disposition of property.75 In my own view, it is not 
possible to defend an originalist, or indeed any other, view of the Tak-
ings Clause that limits its scope solely to physical seizure or occupation. 
Does one want to insist that there is no taking when the government 
prevents by force an owner from entering his own property that the 
state in turn does not occupy, when the action is surely the practical 
equivalent of taking a restrictive covenant over the entire property? But 
for these purposes, Whitney does capture my position on the compre-
hensive reach of the Takings Clause: that the Takings Clause covers, 
prima facie, all partial takings by government that include the loss of 
air rights, mineral rights, liens, or reversionary interests.76 
What is common about both Wood’s Sweeney dissent and Foust’s 
Machinists decision is that they take for granted the current intellec-
tual framework of takings law, without thinking through its structure 
as a matter of first principle. The gap between my position in Takings 
and the current law, which gives scant protection to regulatory takings, 
is indeed enormous. My essential argument in Takings was that all tak-
ings are prima facie covered in the same fashion, whether they are for 
a total or a partial interest in property. The range of partial interests 
in property is huge, for it includes all the various life estates and re-
mainders, leases, mortgages, covenants, and easements. To be sure, the 
comprehensive theory includes extensive set-offs to the prima facie that 
 
 73 Heather M. Whitney, Friedrichs: An Unexpected Tool for Labor, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
191, 194 (2016) (emphasis added). Ms. Whitney was a clerk for Judge Wood. 
 74 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1985). 
 75 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Polit-
ical Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 840 (1995). 
 76 EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 35–106. 
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include the police power justifications on the one hand, and, on the 
other, rules dealing with implicit-in-kind compensation that come into 
play when a broad regulation simultaneously benefits and burdens the 
same group of individuals.77 There is no reason to cut down on the broad 
definition of private property that faithfully tracks the common law def-
inition. 
Unfortunately, the Treanor approach requires drawing a categori-
cal distinction between “mere” restrictions on land use and physical oc-
cupations that are built into the law in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York,78 and on which the Machinists analysis is said to 
rest. But the conceptual line is untenable: Is keeping someone from us-
ing his own air rights, a recognized interest at issue in Penn Central,79 
a physical or a regulatory taking? Should no compensation be provided 
if the government excludes the owner from property rights even if it 
chooses not to occupy those rights itself ? The case looks far closer to 
those, most notably Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,80 
in which there is a permanent or temporary occupation of property by 
or authorized by the government that counts as a per se taking, i.e. one 
that is subject to a few narrow exceptions. 
In order to see how these alternative frameworks apply to RTW 
laws, it is necessary to first ask how they apply to the NLRA as origi-
nally enacted before Section 14(b) and RTW. As I have long argued, the 
NLRA is dead on arrival under the classical liberal view.81 At the very 
least it forces employers to do business with workers in competitive in-
dustries when there is no common carrier arrangement involved. The 
loss of the ability to choose one’s trading partners is a limitation on the 
rights of disposition of their property, including their capital. Yet there 
is no return benefit of any sort to the employer, nor plausible argument 
that an ordinary business is a public or private nuisance that the state 
can regulate under the police power. At this point the entire NLRA falls. 
It was just that conclusion that was rightly reached in two key pre-1937 
 
 77 See EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 107–60, 195. 
 78 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 79 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). 
 80 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 
657 (1981) (“[T]he fact that a regulatory ‘taking’ may be temporary, by virtue of the government’s 
power to rescind or amend the regulation, does not make it any less of a constitutional ‘taking.’ 
Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that ‘takings’ must be permanent and irrevo-
cable. Nor does the temporary reversible quality of a regulatory ‘taking’ render compensation for 
the time of the ‘taking’ any less obligatory.”). For a more recent attempt to resuscitate the distinc-
tion, see Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Unfinished Business of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 734 (2017). 
 81 EPSTEIN, supra note 74, at 280–81. 
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cases, Adair v. United States82 and Coppage v. Kansas,83 which were 
written in the classical liberal tradition. Sadly, both cases have been 
overruled, but if the higher level of scrutiny that they embody still ap-
plies, there is no reason to worry about the RTW exception to the basic 
law. It falls when the NLRA falls under the combined weight of these 
two distinctions. It is not likely that any defender of the modern labor 
law would want to embrace this analysis. 
The next question is how the NLRA fares under the more modern 
analysis that does not give substantial protection to economic liberties. 
Again, the question of characterization makes this issue harder than it 
seems. The statute, like the rent control statutes,84 was upheld before 
the modern distinction between physical and regulatory takings was 
adopted. But even if one takes the Treanor view that limits the Takings 
Clause to physical invasions, both rent control and labor statutes are 
unconstitutional under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp.85 because the government has authorized the CATV company to 
physically enter a landlord’s property, or a firm’s plant, without requir-
ing payment of just compensation.86 Judge Wood accepts a version of 
this proposition when she writes that what the Interest on Lawyers 
Trust Account (IOLTA)87 cases establish “for us is that a state law com-
pelling one private party to give property to another private party must 
be assessed under the Takings Clause. The fact that those two cases 
involved money [IOLTA], while our case involve the compulsory provi-
sion of services, is of no moment.”88 
Although she does not discuss it, Judge Wood’s same logic carries 
over to rent control laws where the landlord renews the lease of a tenant 
for rates below the fair market value required under the Just Compen-
sation Clause, but there is no liability under current law. Her logic also 
applies to Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,89 which recognizes that a 
union has long-term rights to enter into limited portions of the em-
ployer’s property in order to organize labor workers against the em-
ployer’s interest.90 The decisions in both the rent control and the union 
 
 82 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
 83 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating the Kansas law), overruled by Phelps, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
 84 See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (validating two-year rent control statute). 
 85 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 86 Id. at 426. 
 87 Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
 88 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 674 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J., dissenting), discussing Phil-
lips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998), amongst other authorities. 
 89 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
 90 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803–05, n. 10 (1945) (citing 49 N.L.R.B. at 
843–44). 
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case did not accept any version of a takings argument, even though the 
private party was allowed to enter or stay in possession of property un-
der government authorization. Neither of these cases accepted the need 
for just compensation under the Takings Clause, even though modern 
law treats the right to exclude as lying at the core of private property.91 
But under Judge Wood’s view the law has to reverse itself on both 
counts, revealing a seemingly insurmountable logical contradiction. 
She cannot have it both ways: she cannot ignore the possessory rules in 
dealing with the validity of the NLRA and then treat it as decisive with 
respect to the state option to enact a RTW law. The account that she 
gives to require just compensation from Indiana under the RTW is the 
account that invalidates the NLRA at its inception. And once the NLRA 
is struck down on takings grounds, any issue of the constitutionality of 
the RTW law never arises. 
To make matters even worse, there is a credible argument that nei-
ther the rent control laws nor the labor laws satisfy the public use prong 
of the Takings Clause. Both of these statutory frameworks are solely for 
the direct benefit of private parties. At no point do members of the pub-
lic have the right to enter a rent controlled apartment or a union work-
place. Hence these statutes should be suspect even under the narrow 
reading of public use found in Kelo v. City of New London,92 which says 
categorically: “it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take 
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another pri-
vate party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”93 That conclu-
sion is doubly true in these two cases, since in the aggregate, both stat-
utes, by reducing the size of the social pie, have negative effects on the 
public welfare as a whole. Under the conventional readings of Kelo, 
these arguments will of course be rejected out of hand, with indignation 
and anger, given that public use tends to be equated with any conceiv-
able public purpose. After all, the highly relaxed rational basis test that 
governs the inquiry lets the legislature make its own assessment of pub-
lic convenience, without any serious judicial oversight.94 But if the Pub-
lic Use Clause bans takings for private use, then even under the current 
law, the NLRA falls as a whole, so that the question of the constitution-
ality of section 14(b) does not arise. 
 
 91 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (accepting the right to 
exclude as a private property right: “we hold that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a 
fundamental element of the property right . . .”). 
 92 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 93 Id. at 477. Note if indirect benefits are counted, then this rule is vapid. 
 94 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (“We do not sit to determine whether a par-
ticular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclu-
sive.”); see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952). 
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Judge Wood also writes as if the union was forced to donate its ser-
vices to its nonmembers,95 but in so doing she overlooks the quid pro 
quo that the union receives. The first point is that the dissenting work-
ers cannot turn down a gift, which is always possible in ordinary dona-
tive situations. She also undervalues the enormous leverage that the 
NLRA gives to unions, with or without Section 14(b), in the form of the 
exclusive bargaining rights for all workers against management that is 
now bound to bargain with the unions in good faith. At one point she 
chides the majority by denying that the union’s “seat at the bargaining 
table” somehow compensates it for the myriad real costs it incurs on 
behalf of nonmembers.96 She then observes two points. First, she insists 
that the union only claims its seat at the bargaining table by winning a 
representation election: “it does not win that seat either through the 
grace of the employer or in exchange for some kind of quid pro quo from 
either the employer or the bargaining-unit employees.”97 Second, she 
notes that the collective bargaining process also confers “such features 
as no-strike clauses, management rights clauses, and a grievance pro-
cedure, all of which are a win-win for both labor and management.”98 
These arguments fail. Under her account, employers should be ea-
ger to welcome unions in order to obtain the benefits of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. But this rosy account is false. The real quid pro quo 
given to the union is the list of unfair labor practices that forces man-
agement to bargain with the union at all. It is the statutory grant of the 
power to bargain, coupled with the employer’s duty to bargain in good 
faith, which offer unions enormous chips that they did not have at com-
mon law, where any employer could walk away from any union if it 
chose without having to divide its control of the firm through long, bit-
ter, and potentially disruptive negotiations. These enormous and unde-
served benefits remain with or without the RTW option at either the 
state or federal level, and should be duly considered as a counterweight 
in this context. It is foolish to say that the union receives no compensa-
tion when it retains these advantages, even if it cannot force dissident 
workers to support their mission under Section 14(b). 
At this point, it becomes clear that the only way to salvage the 
NLRA is to revert to the highly deferential rational basis analysis that 
was invoked to sustain it against various constitutional challenges in 
the first place. When it comes to complex economic arrangements, the 
argument goes, Congress is boss. The oft-cited proposition from Usery 
 
 95 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 674 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 96 Id. at 684 (quoting majority opinion at 667). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
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v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.99 states: “It is by now well established 
that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life 
come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the 
burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that 
the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”100 That 
decision justified retroactive legislation by which one party was forced 
to pay into a compensation fund for harms for which it bore no respon-
sibility. In effect, legislation required a donation from one group to an-
other. If, however, the rational basis test is used to sustain the basic 
NLRA from constitutional attack, it also sustains the Indiana RTW law 
as part of the elaborate ad hoc compromise in management labor rela-
tionships. If Congress could retroactively impose taxes on particular 
parties, it is not bound to keep the original form of the NLRA for all 
time. Put otherwise, if the rest of the Taft-Hartley amendments were 
constitutional, so too is Section 14(b). 
A similar analysis applies to the confused reasoning offered by 
Judge Foust in Machinists, which on many points tracks the arguments 
of Judge Wood on two key but erroneous propositions. First, that the 
DFR protects non-union members against discrimination;101 and se-
cond, that the union receives nothing of value in exchange for the ser-
vices that it is required under law to supply to these workers.102 He also 
insists that services rendered are property protected by the takings 
law.103 His distinctive contribution is to analyze this case under the low-
level rational basis test in Penn Central, only to strike it down on the 
grounds that the government cannot put forward any reason to justify 
the adoption of the RTW law. He thus looks to the famous three-part 
test in that case to ask about “(1) the economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant, (2) its interference with distinct investment backed ex-
pectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action.”104 He then 
recites the loss of dues to the union that follows from the adoption of 
the RTW and assumes it creates the prima facie case. Then he makes 
the further case, without argument or evidence, that the adoption of the 
RTW “is threatening to the unions’ very economic viability,”105 while 
failing to explain why unions have continued to operate unimpeded for 
years in RTW states. 
 
 99 428 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 100 Id. at 15 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); then citing Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)). 
 101 Machinists, No. 2015CV000628, 2016 WL 8504732, at *4 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016). 
 102 Id. at *4. 
 103 Id. at *8–11. 
 104 Id. at *11 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 105 Id. at *13. 
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He next pushes the extreme claim that the plaintiffs have the “distinct, 
investment-backed expectation that they would always have a right to 
collect fair-share payments from non-members as long as they were 
compelled to provide them [with] services.”106 It is also worth asking 
how unions possibly have formed any expectation that they could re-
ceive dues from all workers when RTW laws have been on the books 
long before the Sweeney litigation. But in all that time no one had ever 
advanced the fair-share argument. Nor is it explained how unions can 
have formed that view in the teeth of a statute that gives states the 
explicit power to pass RTW laws that blocked the agency shop. Under 
current law, even in those cases where strong contractual rights were 
at issue, it has been repeatedly held that the government can strip in-
dividuals of their rights without offering any compensation at all. In 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,107 the Court rejected 
a challenge under the Due Process Clause in a unanimous decision that 
placed extensive reliance on the Court’s earlier decision in Turner 
Elkhorn. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,108 the Supreme 
Court again unanimously relied on Penn Central and Turner Elkhorn 
to undermine vested rights when it said: “This interference with the 
property rights of an employer arises from a public program that ad-
justs the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good and, under our cases, does not constitute a taking requiring Gov-
ernment compensation.”109 The Court then concluded that the applica-
ble legislation did not interfere with reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations: “Prudent employers then had more than sufficient notice not 
only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also that with-
drawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations.”110 It is 
worth saying that the claimant’s case in both Gray and Connolly was 
far stronger than any claim that might be raised here, because the pri-
vate parties relied on explicit contractual guarantees that were nowhere 
to be found in the RTW law. The decision of Judge Foust in Mechanists 
is so far off the reservation as to defy belief. 
 
 106 Id. 
 107 467 U.S. 717 (1984). 
 108 475 U.S. 211 (1986). 
 109 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 221, 225 (1986) (citing Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); then citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1976)). 
 110 Id. at 227; see Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732 (1984); 
see also Fed. Housing Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) (“Those who do business 
in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amend-
ments to achieve the legislative end.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The RTW laws are a long-accepted feature of American labor law. 
In this essay, I have argued that they are an acceptable response to the 
federal system of collective bargaining, and, in fact, improve overall so-
cial welfare by cutting down on the monopoly power that unions can 
acquire under the NLRA. It is also the case that their constitutional 
status was widely accepted on all sides of the debate until the recent 
flurry of activity which has led to the adoption of RTW laws in the Mid-
west. There is little doubt that these laws further compromised the al-
ready-troubled status of organized labor leading unions to bring forth a 
set of initiatives, including litigation, to strengthen their hands. In deal-
ing with these issues, the current legal system adopts the low-level of 
scrutiny associated with Turner Elkhorn and Penn Central to justify a 
wide set of privileges to union power that were never accepted any-
where at common law. Long before the current controversies developed, 
I have passionately insisted that the rejection of the common law rules 
has set in motion a train of events that have wreaked genuine disloca-
tion on labor markets.111 In another time and another place, I would be 
happy to defend this view against all comers. But for these purposes it 
is only necessary to take a more modest position in defense of the status 
quo ante, which has now come under attack. The simple proposition is 
Section 14(b) of the NLRA means what it has always been understood 
to mean: States are free to pass RTW laws that remove any and all un-
ion security arrangements, including the agency shop, and this position 
does not offend the Constitution by taking private property from the 
union, including their union services, without just compensation. To my 
mind, these propositions are so utterly conventional that it is hard to 
see why or how they could be rejected by anyone on any side of the po-
litical spectrum. But once those arguments have been advanced in a 
forceful way, it becomes incumbent to say why they are against the stat-
utory text, the legislative history, the uniform practice, and the consti-
tutional principles that govern labor relations. 
 
 111 Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Legis-
lation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A 
Rejoinder to Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, Labor 
Unions: Saviors or Scourges?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
